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ABSTRACT 
The rise of machine learning has brought closer scrutiny to 
intelligent systems, leading to calls for greater transparency and 
explainable algorithms. We explore the effects of transparency on 
user perceptions of a working intelligent system for emotion 
detection. In exploratory Study 1, we observed paradoxical effects 
of transparency which improves perceptions of system accuracy 
for some participants while reducing accuracy perceptions for 
others. In Study 2, we test this observation using mixed methods, 
showing that the apparent transparency paradox can be explained 
by a mismatch between participant expectations and system 
predictions. We qualitatively examine this process, indicating that 
transparency can undermine user confidence by causing users to 
fixate on flaws when they already have a model of system 
operation. In contrast transparency helps if users lack such a 
model. Finally, we revisit the notion of transparency and suggest 
design considerations for building safe and successful machine 
learning systems based on our insights. 
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1 Introduction 
Machine learning algorithms power intelligent systems that 
pervade our everyday lives. These systems make decisions 
ranging from routes to work to recommendations about criminal 
parole [2,7]. As humans with limited time and energy, we 
increasingly delegate responsibility to these systems with little 
reflection or oversight. Nevertheless, intelligent systems face 
mounting concerns about how they make decisions; concerns that 
are exacerbated by recent machine learning advances like deep 
learning that are difficult to explain in human-comprehensible 
terms. Major public concerns have arisen following 
demonstrations of unfairness in algorithmic systems with regards 
to gender, race, and other characteristics [8,66,70]. The need for 
explanation and transparency is a core problem that is threatening 
adoption of intelligent systems in many realms [28,57,74].  
There are many important reasons why algorithmic transparency 
is needed. Greater transparency can potentially increase user 
control and improve acceptance of complex algorithmic systems 
[38]. It can also promote user learning and insight from complex 
data, as humans increasingly work with complex inferential 
systems for analytic purposes [38,64]. Transparency can also 
enable important oversight by system designers. Without 
transparency it may be unclear whether an algorithm is optimizing 
the intended behavior [29,47], or whether an algorithm has 
negative, unintended consequences (e.g. filter bubbles in social 
media; [9,58]). Given these issues, it is increasingly possible that 
transparency, “a right to explanation”, may become a legal 
requirement in some contexts [25]. These points have led some 
researchers to argue that machine learning must be ‘interpretable 
by design’ [1,40], and even essential for the adoption of intelligent 
systems, such as in cases of medical diagnoses [28,74]. 
While such calls for transparency are admirable, it is unclear 
exactly what is needed to enact them in practice. Extensive 
research about how to operationalize transparency has risen from 
both machine learning and HCI communities but no clear 
consensus has resulted [1,18,73]. The how of transparency is 
difficult—there are numerous implementation trade-offs involving 
accuracy and fidelity. Making a complex algorithm 
understandable to users might require explanatory simplification, 
which often comes at the cost of reduced accuracy of explanation 
[41,65]. For example, methods have been proposed to explain 
neural network algorithms in terms of more traditional machine 
learning approaches, but these explanations necessarily present 
approximations of the actual algorithms deployed [49].  
In addition, recent empirical studies have also attempted to 
present a case for the why of transparency; however, these studies 
have shown puzzling and sometimes contradictory effects. In 
some settings there are expected benefits:  transparency improves 
algorithmic perceptions because users may better understand 
system behavior [37,38,45]. But in other circumstances, 
transparency can have other quite paradoxical effects. 
 
 
Transparency may cause user to have worse perceptions of a 
system, trusting it less because the transparency led them to 
question the system even when it was correct [45]. Providing 
system explanations may also undermine user perceptions when 
users lack the attentional capacity to process complex 
explanations for example while they are executing a demanding 
task [11,75]. There is mixed evidence for user why transparency 
should be implemented for users. 
These results indicate that we lack a clear explanation of why 
transparency has seemingly contradictory effects. The current 
study aims to provide such an explanation. Rather than focusing 
on how to operationalize transparency or why to be transparent, 
we frame the problem differently: when is the best time to present 
transparency? We approach this question using empirical mixed-
methods to understand transparency in the context of a working 
algorithm that interprets a user’s description of an emotional 
experience. In two studies, we explore the connection between the 
impact of transparency and the user/system context it is presented 
in. We identify instances when transparency increases users’ 
understanding and confidence, as well as when it might undermine 
user confidence. We examine the relationship between user 
expectations, system output, and transparency. We address the 
following research questions (RQs):  
• (RQ1): When does transparency help versus hinder 
users’ perceptions of complex systems? (Study 1 & 2) 
• (RQ2): Why does transparency help or hinder user 
understanding? (Study 1 & 2) 
• (RQ3): How does transparency influence users’ 
expectations and perceptions of system error? (Study 2) 
To answer these questions, we conducted two studies. Study 1 
explores how users engage with and understand a transparent 
working intelligent system using ‘think-aloud’ and semi-
structured interviewing methods. Study 2 takes our observations 
from Study 1 and incorporates a quantitative design to test 
predictions regarding how users form perceptions of accuracy in 
the intelligent system. We then explain these results in terms of 
expectation violation and theories of social explanation. 
1.1 Contribution 
We contribute to the growing literature on algorithmic 
transparency through two user evaluations of a working intelligent 
system in the Personal Informatics domain. Previous research on 
transparency and intelligibility has had highly mixed results. 
Positive system perceptions can be built through transparency 
[17,37,46], even to the point of overconfidence [23]. At the same 
time, however, positive system perceptions can also be 
undermined by transparency [20,37,45,54]. Our approach draws 
on psychological and sociological theories of communication 
applied to HCI [24,26,59,69] to explain when, why, and how 
users want transparency. Our findings reveal that transparency can 
have both positive and negative effects depending on context. We 
present a model that shows how the context of transparency and 
expectation violation interact in forming user perceptions of 
system accuracy. Transparency information has positive effects 
both in helping users form initial working models of system 
operation and reassuring those who feel the system is operating in 
unexpected ways. At the same time, negative effects can arise 
when transparency reveals algorithmic errors that can undermine 
confidence in those who already have a coherent view of system 
operation. We explain our results using theories of occasioned 
explanation [24,26], arguing that transparency information is 
anomalous for users who feel the system is operating correctly 
and therefore undermines their confidence in the system. Design 
implications include a greater focus on what situations necessitate 
a transparent explanation as well as improved algorithmic error 
presentation.  
2 Related Work 
2.1 Folk Theories of Algorithms 
A wealth of prior work has explored issues surrounding algorithm 
transparency in the commercial deployments of systems for social 
media and news curation. Social media feeds are often curated by 
algorithms that may be invisible to users (e.g., Facebook. Twitter, 
LinkedIn). At one point, most users were unaware that Facebook 
newsfeeds were not simply all the posts that their friends made 
[21]. These users reacted in surprise and sometimes anger when 
they were shown the posts that were missing from their newsfeed. 
Later research shows that many users of Facebook develop ‘folk 
theories’ of their social feed [19], which are imprecise heuristics 
about how the system works, even going so far as to make 
concrete plans based upon their folk theories. This work also 
showed that making the design more transparent or seamful, 
allowed users to generate multiple folk theories and more readily 
compare and contrast between them [19]. 
Other work has illustrated issues regarding incorrect folk theories 
in the domain of intelligent personal informatics systems, showing 
specific challenges in how users understand these systems. Users 
are prone to blindly believing outputs from algorithmic systems, a 
phenomena referred to as algorithmic omniscience [20,32,67] and 
automation bias [15,53]. For example, KnowMe [72] is a program 
that infers personality traits from a user’s posts on social media 
based on Big Five personality theory. KnowMe users were quick 
to defer to algorithmic judgment about their own personalities, 
stating that the algorithm is likely to have greater credibility than 
their own personal statements (e.g., “...At the end of the day, that’s 
who the system says I am...”). Similar results were shown in [32], 
showing that participants expected intelligent personal informatics 
systems to serve as ground truth for their experiences and even 
attributed superhuman qualities to these devices, e.g., “...[it] could 
tell me about an emotion I don‘t know that I am feeling...”. Other 
experiments indicate the risk of such trust, showing that users may 
believe even entirely random system outputs as moderately 
accurate [67]. Similarly, giving users placebo controls over an 
algorithmic interface shows similar results [71]; when given 
placebo controls, users felt more satisfied with their newsfeed. 
 Without a standard of transparency in intelligent systems, it may 
be easy to deceive end-users into believing they are using a real 
system; this is a dangerous proposition when apps can be so easily 
distributed.  
2.2 Transparency and Expectation Violation 
There is a long history of studying transparency and intelligibility 
in automated systems [5]. However, the results have mixed and 
often indicate contradictory effects. Many experiments have 
indicated that transparency improves user perceptions of the 
system [17,46]. Others have shown that interventions that simply 
show prediction confidence improve users system perceptions [3]. 
In extreme cases, animations that simulate apparent transparency 
can cause users to be overconfident about systems even when they 
err [23].  
Other studies show less positive effects for user perceptions of a 
system. Participants who completed an experiment using a 
hypothetical transparent system were led to question the system 
an increased amount, resulting in worse agreement with the 
system [45]. However, the effect may be opposite for high 
certainty systems—transparency may only result in higher user 
agreement. Muir and Moray conclude that any hint of error in an 
automated system will decrease trust [54]. More recent work 
indicates other effects; explanations of how a system is working 
may lead to increased trust [37] but further explanations may be 
harmful to user perceptions. However, these effects are dependent 
upon the amount of expectation violation that a user experiences. 
User expectation violation follows an event where a system 
behaves in a way that a user did not expect [37,67,71]. To use an 
example from Kizilcec, if a student in an online course is 
confident of their abilities and the correctness of their work, they 
may experience expectation violation when they receive an 
automated test score that is very low. 
Recently, the machine learning community has begun grappling 
with issues of transparency and explainability. This seems due to 
the rise of more inscrutable methods like deep learning as well as 
legal requirements arising from the European Union’s GDPR . 
Some machine learning models are “inherently understandable” 
such as linear models and Generalized Additive Models [48,73]. 
These understandable models can be “explained” to users simply 
through the linear contributions of their features. Other algorithms 
such as deep neural nets and random forests are inscrutable, and it 
is nontrivial to explain how input features match to output 
predictions [73]. Many attempts have been made to make these 
inscrutable algorithms understandable. These rely on 
approximating the inscrutable algorithm through a simple local or 
linear model than can be explained to the end user [49,64].  
However, it is not clear when users want such explanations or 
how these explanations should be framed. Many such AI attempts 
at transparency are not tested with users or have simulated user 
studies [4,52,55]. We must first learn when and how users will 
benefit from such transparency before we can begin to apply the 
techniques that have been developed. 
2.3 Explanation and Persuasion Theory 
People interact with computers and intelligent systems in ways 
that directly mirror how they interact with people [56,63]. 
Therefore, we turn to psychology and sociology for theory to 
inform how transparency should operate. Transparency allows for 
explanation of why a model made a given prediction. Therefore, 
we can turn to fields such as psychology and sociology for 
guidance about operationalizing explanations; these fields have a 
long history of studying explanation. Hilton shows that causal 
explanation takes the form of conversation and thus is governed 
by the common-sense rules of conversation [30]. Grice previously 
elucidated these rules, stating that participants communicate 
together following implicit rules known as the “Cooperative 
Principle” [26]: The cooperative principle consists of 4 maxims: 
Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner. Most relevant to us is 
Quantity—”1. Make your contribution as informative as required. 
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is 
required.” Also of interest are Garfinkel’s breaching experiments 
where social norms are violated [24]. One example of this is an 
experimenter asking for repeated explanation of commonplace 
phrases like responding to a “How are you?” from an 
acquaintance with “How am I with regard to what? My health, my 
finances, my school work, my peace of mind, my …?” These 
breaching experiments caused exasperation and social sanctions 
from those who experienced them. It seems likely that people will 
similarly sanction systems who breach social norms of 
explanation. 
Additionally, we see parallels between how people interact with 
intelligent systems and persuasion. The Elaboration Likelihood 
Model (ELM) is a dual process model of persuasion [59]. The 
ELM posits that two parallel processes are engaged when a person 
evaluates an argument, similar to Kahneman’s conception of 
System 1 and 2 thinking [34]. The central processing route 
involves careful consideration of the argument and complex 
integration into a person’s beliefs. The central route is often 
engaged in high stakes decisions. The peripheral route in contrast 
focuses on heuristic cues such as the attractiveness of the speaker, 
the person’s current affect, the number and length of the 
arguments, and other cues not directly related to the content of the 
argument. Prior work on intelligent systems seems to align with 
this dual process model [37], people understand systems through 
peripheral routes if their expectations are met, only engaging in 
central processing when their expectations are violated. This is 
also demonstrated this in the context of Google search 
suggestions; where users felt the cost of processing explanations 
outweighed their benefits [11]. 
2.4 Emotional Analytics 
Our focus is on how users interact with an intelligent personal 
informatics systems which are being increasingly deployed within 
commercial [77–80] and research domains [6,22,31,50,76]. These 
systems track how a person operates on some dimension, whether 
physical, emotional, or mental, and then can suggest 
improvements to this behavior through customized feedback and 
 
 
suggestions [31,61]. Such data potentially allows users to analyze 
and modify their behaviors to promote well-being [12,13,33].  
Furthermore, in contrast to other work that presents hypothetical 
scenarios in which participants read about or watch algorithmic 
deployments and decisions [23,45], our aim was to have users 
experience the algorithm in situ, as it directly made decisions 
about their own data [36]. One important characteristic of 
emotional interpretation is that users are knowledgeable about the 
status of their own feelings and experiences, allowing them to 
directly compare algorithmic interpretations with their own 
personal evaluations of their emotional experiences. This contrasts 
with other applications of smart algorithms, such as medical 
diagnoses. In these complex realms regular users might be less 
able to interpret the results of algorithmic interpretations. In 
addition, emotion is highly variable between individuals and 
previous research demonstrates difficulty in accurately predicting 
emotion from text [43,62]. This allows us to closely examine how 
users understand a system under varying degrees of error. 
3 Research System: E-meter 
We developed a working system called the E-meter that uses 
textual entries to predict emotion. The E-meter (Figs 1,2) presents 
users with a web page showing a system depiction, a short 
description of the system, instructions, and a text box to write in. 
The system was described as an “algorithm that assesses the 
positivity/negativity of [their] writing”.  
   The algorithm underlying emotion detection worked in the 
following way: each word that was written by the user was 
checked for its positive/negative emotion association in our 
model. If it was found in the model, the overall mood rating in the 
system was updated. This constitutes an incremental linear 
regression that recalculates each time a word is written.  
3.1 Machine Learning Model 
As we outlined in the background, current processes for 
explanation of inscrutable models such as deep neural networks 
involve approximating the inscrutable model by a simpler, often 
linear, model [73]. Therefore, we focus on a linear model so that 
our transparency can be operationalized in a way that is faithful to 
current research.  
Emotion predictions for users’ experiences were generated using a 
linear regression model trained on text from the EmotiCal project 
[31,68]. In EmotiCal, users wrote short textual entries about daily 
experiences and evaluated their mood in relation to those 
experiences. This data gave us a gold-standard supervised training 
set on which to train our linear regression. We trained the linear 
regression on 6249 textual entries and mood scores from 164 
EmotiCal users. Text features were stemmed using the Porter 
stemming algorithm [60] and then the top 600 unigrams were 
selected by F-score, i.e. we selected the 600 words that were most 
strongly predictive of user emotion ratings. Using a train/test split 
of 85/15 the linear regression tested at R2 = 0.25; mean absolute 
error was .95 on the target variable (mood) scale of (-3,3). In 
order to implement this model on a larger range for the E-meter, 
we scaled the predictions to (0,100) to create a more continuous 
and variable experience for users. The mean absolute error of our 
model indicates that the E-meter will, on average, err by 15.83 
points on a (0,100) scale for each user’s mood prediction.  
Version 1: Document-level:  
As users wrote, the E-meter showed the system’s interpretation of 
the emotion of their writing. If the overall text was interpreted as 
positive, the meter filled the gauge to the right and turned more 
green (Fig 2); if the text was interpreted negatively, the gauge was 
emptied to the left and turned more red (Fig 1). This feedback 
represents the coarse and global feedback that many machine 
learning systems currently display. These systems give an overall 
rating but don’t allow the user insight into the detailed workings 
of the algorithm. 
Version 2: Word-level  
 In contrast with the Document-level version, the word-level 
condition provided fine-grained transparency. We operationalized 
transparency by highlighting the mood association of each word 
in the model; if a word is highly associated with a positive mood 
then it will be highlighted green, a word associated with a 
negative mood will be highlighted orange or red. The word-level 
version showed immediate incremental feedback of how the 
system interpreted each word as the user types. In this word-level 
Figure 2: E-meter Word-Level Feedback Condition 
 
Figure 1: E-meter Document-Level Feedback Condition 
 
 condition, individual words are highlighted and color coded 
according to how the underlying algorithm interpreted that word’s 
affect. This incremental feedback allows users to see how each 
individual word they wrote contributed to the overall E-meter 
rating. Furthermore, words remained highlighted as users 
continued to type allowing them to continue to assess their 
contribution to the overall score.  
This form of transparency offers users insight into the underlying 
word-based regression model driving the E-meter visualization; it 
depicts how the regression model correlates each word with 
positive or negative emotion to arrive at an overall weighting for 
the entire text that the user has entered. The fact that the 
visualization is persistent also allows users to reexamine what 
they have written, reconciling the overall E-meter rating with the 
fine-grained word-level connotations. 
We could have operationalized transparency in other ways. Other 
researchers have operationalized transparency through natural 
language explanations [37] and diagrams [45]. However, in our 
case we can convey nearly the entire working of the system 
through word highlighting. In addition, our operationalization 
allow the answering of counterfactual questions, an important part 
of explanation [51,73]. Highlighting the text is a non-intrusive 
way of conveying to the user what drives the algorithm and gives 
direct clues about the underlying linear model. In addition, by 
varying the colors of the highlighting we also show how the 
model is interpreting the specific words. 
4 Study 1 
Our first exploratory study aimed to understand the processes by 
which participants make sense of a complex algorithm that 
interprets their emotions.  
4.1 Method 
4.1.2 Users. Twelve users were recruited from an internal 
participant pool at a large United States west-coast university. 
They received course credit for participation. Participants average 
age was 19.54 years (sd=1.52) and 7/12 identified as female. This 
study was approved by an Institutional Review Board. 
4.1.3 Measures. All survey questions requested Likert scale 
responses unless stated otherwise. Participants were asked about 
their experience with the E-meter including: “Select the number 
of times you looked at the visualization while you were writing” 
and subsequently “If you looked at the visualization more than 
once: Rate the extent to which looking at the visualization 
impacted or did not impact your writing.” We next probed user 
evaluations of system accuracy and their trust in the system: 
“How accurate or inaccurate did you find the E-meter?” and 
“How trustworthy or untrustworthy did you find the E-meter 
system?” In addition to these questions, we used a shortened 
version of the Psychological General Well-Being Index (PGWBI) 
to screen for mental health before participants began the study 
[27]. 
Additionally, we assessed users’ perceptions of the emotion of 
their writing: “How positive or negative did you feel our writing 
was?”, as well as the system’s evaluations of their writing: “How 
positive or negative did the E-meter assess your writing to be?” 
We used the absolute difference of these two measures to 
calculate an aggregate measure of expectation violation. If the E-
meter were perfect, it would always predict exactly how the user 
felt and expectation violation would be 0. If a user felt that their 
writing was “Strongly Negative” (1) but the E-meter rated it as 
“Slightly Negative” (3) then the user’s expectation violation 
would be 2.  
4.1.4 Procedure. The participants were randomly divided into one 
of two conditions. Both groups were given document-level 
affective feedback from the E-meter scale as shown in Fig 1. 
• Condition 1: Six participants received real-time 
incremental word-level feedback about the algorithm’s 
interpretation of their affect as they typed each word.  
• Condition 2: The other six only obtained word-level 
feedback after they had finished the writing task; these 
users explicitly requested word-level feedback by 
clicking a button labeled “How was this rating 
calculated?”.  
The researcher explained the experiment and think-aloud 
procedure, demonstrating a think-aloud on an email client. The 
researcher asked participants to “Please write at least 100 words 
about an emotional experience that affected you in the last week.” 
In cases where the participant had trouble thinking aloud, they 
were prompted to speak. After the think-aloud writing exercise, 
the experimenter conducted a semi-structured interview that 
included an on-screen survey that the participants continued 
thinking aloud as they answered. After the survey, participants in 
the word-level feedback condition 2 were presented with the final 
state of the E-meter, exactly as they saw it when they finished 
writing. Participants in the initial document-level condition 1 saw  
exactly the same screen with an added button labeled “How was 
this rating calculated” which they pressed to reveal word-level 
highlighting. Finally, all participants were presented with a 
printed version of the final E-meter state with which they marked 
up to indicate errors.  The entire process took around 50 minutes.  
4.1.5 Analysis. Interviews were recorded using both audio and 
screen-recording. Two interviews (one from each condition) were 
not audio recorded, thus only the remaining 10 are used for the 
analysis. Recall RQ1 for this study: When does transparency help 
versus hinder users’ perceptions of complex systems? We 
analyzed the interviews with RQ1 in mind; responses were coded 
using theoretical thematic analysis [10]. We describe the major 
themes related to RQ1 below. 
4.2 Study 1 Results 
Participants engaged meaningfully with the feedback from the E-
meter—all participants consulted feedback at least once and 8/12 
of participants consulted it ‘more than 5 times’. 
 
 
Document-Level Feedback Results in Inaccurate Mental Models: 
Only half of the participants receiving document-level feedback 
formed accurate mental models of the system. Others with 
document-level feedback expressed confusion about how the 
algorithm operated, which in turn negatively affected their system 
perceptions. Participant 10 expressed this confusion and how it 
led them to consider the system as inaccurate: 
P10: I don’t have a way of interpreting it, I wouldn’t know if it’s 
good or bad or what I'm writing is negative or positive…. it’s 
inaccurate cause it doesn’t seem to portray the true emotional 
state of what I wrote, and untrustworthy cause it doesn’t give off 
the right feedback, it doesn’t allow me to interpret it correctly. 
Participant 11 who also received document-level feedback 
considered the E-meter may be working entirely off of “tone in 
my voice” or at random “...this could have been a whole fake 
fluctuation.” 
Word-level feedback Promotes More Accurate Mental Models: 
When we later showed word-level feedback to these document-
level participants, their confusion seemed to dissipate, leading 
them to form more accurate mental models about how the 
algorithm worked. In this quote from Participant 10, note the stark 
difference from their prior quote above; they now are reassured 
that the system is actually working and make excuses why the 
system generated an incorrect rating. 
P10: it goes word by word, it tries to take positivity and negativity 
from each word, I don’t think it really goes by context of what I'm 
writing much more than the word itself, so saying something like 
‘my best friend getting arrested’, it’s definitely in a negative light, 
but because I mention ‘my best friend’, it kinda took it in a 
positive light.” 
In contrast, many participants who received word-level feedback 
throughout formed accurate mental models initially when using 
the system. Participant 5 said: 
P5: I think it tags certain words, for sure, with values probably 1-
4, green, yellow, orange, red, or nothing, that there are certain 
words that are programmed into it. ... Maybe there’s words that it 
knows to look for across the system, like ‘death,’ ‘burial,’ 
negative words.. ‘celebration,’ ‘party,’ it can pick up on across 
the whole thing. 
Word-level transparency information therefore seemed to help 
both groups by promoting insight into how the algorithm was 
making its evaluations, either in real-time or retrospectively. 
These observations suggest overall benefits for word-level 
information, confirming our initial expectations about the value of 
providing this type of transparency feedback. Despite these 
benefits, to our surprise, we also observed some negative effects 
for word-level feedback, which on some occasions seemed to 
undermine some participants’ views of the algorithm.  
Participant 3 when examining the word-level feedback after they 
had written their text noted “...honestly I feel like I don’t see a 
pattern at all and it’s kind of bugging me.” 
Participant 8 first used the document-level feedback system and 
formed a mental model of system operation. Upon being shown 
the word-level feedback they began to question their established 
prior model; this resulted in worse perceptions of the system: 
P8: “Yeah, I’m actually not sure what—I don’t know if it’s just as 
simple as positive versus negative words. I had a solid theory 
before, but it’s falling apart... Well I just assumed that some 
words would be coded as positive or negative and then it would 
just like do a ratio of those two.” 
Overall, it seems that word-level transparency offered people a 
useful heuristic, but this heuristic could be undermined by closer 
analysis.  
Expectation Violation Predicts Accuracy Perceptions: We also 
wanted to quantitatively check whether participants evaluations of 
accuracy related to their expectation violation. As expected, we 
see a strong correlation between the amount of expectation 
violation that users experienced in the visualization and their 
overall perception of the system’s accuracy (r(11)=-0.748, 
p=0.005). In other words, users judge the system as accurate if the 
system’s interpretation is consistent with the user’s evaluation of 
their writing. 
4.3 Study 1 Summary 
Transparency feedback seemed to provide a useful heuristic in 
helping users form working mental models, but closer scrutiny 
and perceived errors may undermine confidence in the system. 
When users felt the system was inaccurate in the document-level 
condition, they were reassured later by word-level feedback 
showing how the system actually worked. However, we also see 
positive system perceptions undermined by the word-level 
feedback when users had established mental models. We set out to 
explore these seemingly contradictory effects in a larger scale 
quantitative study. Again, we compared both forms of feedback, 
but we also wanted to more directly explore potentially differing 
effects of word-level feedback in relation to expectation violation. 
How might word-level feedback both (a) help users who were 
unclear about how the algorithm operated while at the same time 
(b) reduce the confidence of users who already had a working 
theory that was subsequently undermined when they were 
confronted with word-level errors? 
5 Study 2 
5.1 Method 
We used the same system and conditions as Study 1 with one 
important difference. While users in the Document-Level 
feedback condition in Study 1 eventually saw the transparent 
Word-Level feedback after they had completed their writing, in 
Study 2 the conditions are entirely separate, Document-Level 
users never see Word-Level feedback. Users were randomly 
divided into Word-Level and Document-Level conditions and 
instructed to write 100 words about an emotional experience in 
the E-meter system. 
 5.1.1 Users. We recruited 41 users to test the E-meter system who 
had previously passed a short mental health screening (PGWBI) 
[27]. Users were recruited from Amazon Turk and paid $3.33. 
The evaluation took 13 minutes on average. This study was 
approved by an Institutional Review Board. 
5.1.2. Measures. We asked the same questions as Study 1 with the 
addition of the following questions. “Please name 2 or more 
things you like about the system” and “Please name 2 or more 
things you dislike about the system”. “Please give 2-3 ways the 
algorithm affected your writing”, “Imagine that you were given 
personalized tips on how to improve your mood based on what 
you wrote. Would you make use of such suggestions?", “Please 
explain how do you think the system judges your writing.”, “"Did 
you experiment with or manipulate your writing to test how the 
system was working or how accurate it was? If so, how?”, "If you 
have any additional feedback from your interaction with the E-
meter, please detail it here." 
5.2 Study 2 Results 
Participants followed the instructions to write at least 100 words, 
mean=107.74, sd=14.8. As shown in Fig 3, the majority of users 
across conditions found the E-meter to be “Accurate” or “Very 
Accurate” with the median being “Accurate”. Fig 4 shows that 
users found the E-meter to be “Moderately Trustworthy”.  
As in Study 1, we calculate a user’s expectation violation in 
relation to the system’s overall emotion rating. We find that 
transparency and expectation violation interact in a complex 
manner. We see a strong negative correlation between expectation 
violation and accuracy in the document-level group, (r(21) =-.898, 
p < .00001) confirming Study 1, as well as prior work [67]. In 
other words, with document-level feedback, when the system 
behaves as the user expects then it is perceived as accurate. 
However, this correlation between expectation violation and 
accuracy perceptions disappears in the word-level condition: r(16) 
= -0.175, p = 0.488. The relationship between expectation 
violation and accuracy perceptions is clearly more complex in the 
presence of word-level transparency. 
We modeled the effects of the different types of transparency 
more systematically using linear regression predicting user 
accuracy perceptions as dependent variable (see Table 1). Given 
that Study 1 indicated people may respond to transparency 
differently based on expectation violation, independent measures 
in the regression model include expectation violation, condition, 
and an interaction between them. The overall regression was 
highly predictive R2=.548, p < .0001. As expected, both 
transparency and expectation violation are associated with 
perceived accuracy. Counterintuitively, adding word-level 
transparency has an overall negative effect on perceptions of 
accuracy. However, this overall effect depends on expectation 
violation, as indicated by the interaction term in the regression. 
We depict the interaction in Fig 5, which shows that when 
compared with document-level feedback, word-level transparency 
has the expected positive effect when expectation violation is 
high. Confirming our qualitative results from Study 1, people 
using the word-level version of the system show higher levels of 
perceived accuracy when their expectations aren’t met. However, 
the effects of word-level transparency are negative for lower 
levels of expectation violation, when compared with document-
level feedback. Thus, word-level transparency is unhelpful when 
people perceive the system to be accurate.  
One possible explanation could be that users in the Word-Level 
condition were consciously modifying and going back to edit their 
writing in order to achieve an accurate overall rating. Recall that 
we asked users whether they had modified their writing according 
to the feedback from the E-meter. Seventeen of our 41 users said 
Figure 2: Participants found the E-meter Accurate 
Conditions 
 
Figure 4: Participants found the E-meter Moderately 
Trustworthy 
 
 
Coef SE p-value 
Intercept 6.991 0.377 < 0.0001 
Expectation Violation -1.736 0.601 < 0.0001 
Condition -1.406 0.198 0.007 
Condition * Expectation Violation 1.057 0.441 0.022 
 
Table 1: Effects of Transparency on Perceived Accuracy.  
(R2 = .55, p < .0001).  
 
Figure 3: Participants found the E-meter Accurate 
 
 
 
that they changed their writing in order to influence the E-meter’s 
response. However, this did not seem to modify perceptions of 
accuracy of the E-meter. Adding a binary variable for modifying 
writing based on the feedback into our above regression (Table 1) 
was insignificant b=-0.23, p=.61. It seems that users’ accuracy 
perceptions are not meaningfully affected by testing the E-meter. 
To understand these effects further, we explored participant’s 
qualitative responses to better understand the interaction between 
transparency and expectation violate on. 
5.2.1. Document-Level Feedback Results in Vague Mental 
Models: Most users in the document-level feedback condition 
were focused on major shifts in the movement of the meter in 
relation to their writing. For some of these users, document-level 
feedback was consistent with their expectations, helping them to 
form a global, if vague, model of how the algorithm was 
operating. For example, P24 wrote about how the accuracy of the 
system related to the system meeting their expectations: “I was 
writing about a negative topic and it continued to read in the 
negative state.  The more upset I was writing, the further the dial 
went into the red.” Users for whom the document level feedback 
matched their expectations maintained high confidence that the 
system was accurate. 
In contrast, other document-level users drastically lowered their 
confidence in the system’s accuracy when the felt that the system 
outputs contradicted their expectations. P4 felt that the system was 
inaccurate overall but could not form a clear hypothesis about 
exactly why it was failing: “It was highly inaccurate because the 
experience was clearly a negative one, I specifically explained 
how awful I felt, I don't think that it could measure the sentiment 
of what I'm writing.” Others also thought that the system was 
inaccurate, but the absence of transparency led them to speculate 
about other ways it could be working. Participant 11 said “it 
looked at length and speed of what I was typing”; Participant 19 
concurred, saying “i thought it was only reacting to my WPM 
[words per minute]”. 
Overall, document-level users are confident in system operation if 
their expectations are met. If their expectations are violated, they 
seem to doubt the system is working as indicated and, lacking any 
reassurance, this undermined their confidence in the system. 
5.2.2. Word-Level feedback effects depend on expectations: Users 
in the word-level feedback condition formed clear mental models 
of how the system was working in rating individual words to 
arrive at an interpretation. However, even though these users 
seemed relatively confident about the algorithm’s operation, they 
were often distracted or undermined by the system’s 
interpretations of particular words. Participant 28 explained their 
rating of the system’s accuracy as being downgraded by specific 
errors: “It went way down when I typed the word "mad" but that 
was only a small part of the whole situation. The words that were 
good or bad seemed kind of arbitrary too.” Similarly, participant 
30 said: “I wrote, ‘I was not thrilled’ which is a negative 
statement, but this meter took the word 'thrilled' as a very positive 
thing.” 
These examples suggest that, paradoxically, word-level errors 
might undermine some participants whose expectations are met 
and already have a good working theory of the algorithm’s 
operation. To assess this further we examined cases of low 
expectation violation (instances of where users rated the E-meter 
as within 1 point of their own evaluation of their writing). Overall 
for these users the system is operating as expected. We analyzed 
these low expectation violation users to see why presenting word-
level transparency information reduced perceptions of system 
accuracy.  
For these users, word-level transparency seems to create more 
questions than it answered; the additional information provided by 
the word-level highlighting seemed to confuse rather than clarify. 
One participant noted that while the system’s final negative rating 
was consistent with their overall judgement of their own writing, 
the highlighting didn’t make sense “...because the rating did not 
correspond to the number of identified words”; this user also 
noted “It gave a positivity rating of 1 even though it only 
highlighted one or two words as red.” The word-level 
highlighting revealed to other users that the model worked in a 
different way from the user themselves. While users in the 
document-level condition were not able to discern this as a 
problem, word-level feedback users took issue with this. 
Participant 41 said: “The key is to measure the overall emotional 
tone of the passage and it seems to fail at this.” Participant 36 said 
this simply: “I disliked that it cannot understand context.” For 
these users, transparency revealed that the algorithm did not 
conform to their mental models of the task. 
We also examined users who had the opposite experience. We 
looked at users who initially felt that the algorithm was violating 
their expectations, but transparency seemed to help them. For 
Figure 5: Expectation Violation and Transparency Condition 
Interact to Form Accuracy Perceptions 
 
 them word-level transparency seemed to provide reassurance and 
explanation of the system behavior. One user, participant 27 
seemed to note that the system was trying, even if it violated their 
expectations: “I think that it was measuring words i used and 
rated them almost correctly.” In the same vein, Participant 30 said 
“Even though it got several individual things wrong, I think it 
actually did a good job on the whole.” 
Overall, word-level feedback seemed to have somewhat 
contradictory effects depending on the user’s assessment of 
system performance. For users who felt that the system was 
behaving appropriately, noticing word-level errors and non-
conformance to their mental models undermined their views of 
system operation. For others who were less sure about overall 
system accuracy, word-level feedback had the opposite effect, as 
it boosted confidence in the system. These data are consistent with 
Fig 5 showing that compared with document-level feedback, 
word-level feedback reduces accuracy judgements in low 
expectation violation users, but increases it for those who have 
high violations.  
5.3 Study 2 Discussion   
In this study we presented both qualitative and quantitative data 
showing that algorithmic transparency has complex effects that 
depend on users’ expectation violation. Word-level transparency 
users with the most violated expectations had better perceptions of 
the E-meter’s accuracy compared to their document-level 
counterparts. However, users in the word-level condition were 
less likely to regard the system as highly accurate when it did not 
violate their expectations. 
6 Discussion 
Given their widespread deployment, it is imperative that we 
derive new theories and design approaches to improve users’ 
understanding of intelligent systems. Two studies show that fine-
grained algorithmic transparency in a working intelligent system 
can lead to very different effects for different users. Study 1 
showed that some users are reassured when they view word-level 
transparency; it shows them that the system is working even if it 
didn’t generate exactly the interpretation they expected. However, 
for other users, transparency seemed to undermine their 
experience; while overall the system worked as they expected, 
they also detected specific word-level feedback that seemed 
anomalous. Study 2 resolves these apparently contradictory 
observations. We show that there is no one-size fits all solution, as 
responses to word-level transparency depend on users’ level of 
expectation violation. In general, users whose expectations are 
violated strongly will be reassured by the word-level 
transparency. On the other hand, users who initially believe the 
system is operating accurately may begin to question their ratings 
if they are shown word-level transparency. This undermining 
effect seems to be strongly influenced by a user focus on system 
errors; despite an overall view that the system is operating as 
expected, seeing individual errors reduces confidence and system 
trust.  
6.1 Limitations  
The current study explores one algorithmic domain, emotion 
regulation and clearly other contexts need to be explored. 
Furthermore, our deployment of a working algorithm meant that 
results were obtained for situations where our algorithm generated 
moderate numbers of errors, and future research should evaluate 
contexts where there are different levels of errors, including 
extremes of multiple versus few errors. Additionally, while users 
generated their own data while using a real working system, 
results were not directly used to inform other aspects of user’s 
personal behavior such as emotion tracking or emotion regulation, 
so the costs of system errors were low. While this is appropriate 
for exploring understanding of initial algorithms with moderate 
error rates, future work might explore user system models and 
trust in more high stakes contexts. Also, our work explores one 
aspect of transparency namely a dynamic visualization of the 
algorithm, and there are many other ways to depict how an 
algorithm operates including verbal explanations, concrete user 
exploration and so forth [37,39,44,64]. 
6.2 Synthesizing Contradictory Results  
Our results also serve to synthesize and explain previous research 
on transparency and intelligibility that has generated highly mixed 
and sometimes paradoxical results. On the one hand, trust can be 
built through transparency [17,37,46], even to the point of 
overconfidence [23]. At the same time, however, trust can also be 
undermined by transparency [37,45,54]. Our findings indicate that 
this prior work may be rationalized by attending to expectation 
violation. For users who have low confidence in a system, with 
little idea how it works, then transparency can help form working 
system models, thus boosting confidence and trust. In contrast, 
trust can be undermined if users have a working theory of the 
system but are exposed to anomalous behaviors such as system 
errors.  
6.3 Social Communication Theories to Support 
Transparency   
The interactions between transparency and expectations are also 
consistent with social analyses of when explanations are 
needed.  Theories of human communication (e.g. Garfinkel, 
Grice) argue that explanations are occasioned, i.e. that 
explanations are only provided on an ‘as needed’ basis when a 
situational expectation is not met [24,26]. According to these 
theories, transparency is therefore occasioned for expectation 
violations, making it contextually appropriate to provide an 
account for why system behavior is unexpected or unusual. But if 
expectations are met, i.e. the system and situation are perceived as 
going according to plan, then an explanation is anomalous and 
contextually marked, potentially reducing user confidence: 
‘everything is going fine so why are you providing this 
unnecessary information?’. Results are also consistent with the 
elaboration likelihood model [59]; which suggests that users 
might be generally happy to operate with imprecise working 
 
 
heuristics about how an algorithm operates, only invoking 
complex analysis when the algorithm behaves anomalously.  
Our results draw attention to an important and often overlooked 
aspect of transparency. Most research has focused on questions of 
how to explain algorithmic operation, e.g. using approximate 
methods to explain neural nets using methods that everyday users 
will comprehend. In contrast our focus here has been on better 
understanding of when to deploy transparency, as we show that 
providing detailed information about an algorithm’s operation can 
be counterproductive for users who have a working theory of 
system operation. Other work suggests that users do not want to 
be exposed to detailed algorithmic explanations when they are 
cognitively overloaded [32], suggesting a need to develop more 
systematic accounts of when algorithmic explanations are 
occasioned and useful. 
Of course, deciding when to provide algorithmic explanations also 
gives rise to ethical concerns: if users are operating under false 
working assumptions about an algorithm then we need to expose 
and counteract these. Again, this suggests the need for an 
increased research focus on understanding users’ working models 
of systems allowing us to diagnose when these are accurate, and 
when we need to intervene.  This area is extraordinarily complex 
however given applications where positive placebo effects have 
been obtained using algorithms that falsely inform users that their 
stress levels are low [14]. In this case, an inaccurate user model 
and imperfect algorithmic understanding has beneficial outcomes.   
6.4 Design Implications for Intelligent Systems 
Our results also have implications for design. Whether or not 
transparency is beneficial depends on various characteristics of 
the application. For example, if an intelligent system is highly 
accurate overall in its predictions, then increasing the 
transparency may have a net negative effect of reducing 
perceptions of accuracy, given that users are highly attentive to 
even low levels of system error. If an application is inaccurate, 
then transparency could have a net positive by tempering those 
negative accuracy perceptions. Of course, other factors influence 
whether transparency is beneficial, such as the impact of the 
decision that the algorithm is influencing. When costs of errors 
are severe then it is imperative that user attention is drawn to these 
[16,42,81].  
We find that in some contexts, transparency decreases perceptions 
of accuracy. One reason for this decrease seemed to be when 
transparency revealed that the way the system was operating was 
different from a user’s mental model of the task. For example, 
users took issue with the fact that the system didn’t seem consider 
context surrounding some words. Considering context was 
impossible in our machine learning model given that we were 
using solely individual words as features. Decisions made when 
training a machine learning algorithm including feature selection 
and algorithm choice necessarily constrain how transparency can 
be operationalized. This demonstrates that algorithmic decisions 
have direct user experience impacts in transparent applications. 
Current research indicates that we should present transparency in 
ways that bridge the gap between user’s mental models and expert 
mental models of the task [18]. Our work dovetails with this, 
demonstrating that correct choices need to be made concerning 
the machine learning models to even allow for transparency that 
bridges this gap.   
2.3 Presenting Errors in Intelligent Systems 
Our results also draw attention to the critical problem of error 
presentation. All machine learning systems generate errors and 
while users need to be aware of this, our data suggests that in 
some cases users are overly focused on errors even when these are 
relatively infrequent and the system is operating well overall. This 
may be consistent with psychological theories suggest that people 
are generally poor at evaluating probabilities [35]. In any case, it 
indicates the need for much more research on error visualization 
as well as algorithmic success. Other designs suggested by our 
work could address the effects of errors undermining confidence. 
For example, we might only show highlighting on words that the 
system is very confident will be positive or negative in any 
context. Other users wanted to know about the relative weighting 
of positive versus negative words and the algorithm might provide 
more explicit models of this. These design improvements may 
improve perceptions of accuracy across the board allowing users 
to generate more stable models and reduced questioning. 
However, given the ubiquity of errors in all intelligent systems, 
much more research is needed to explore how errors might be 
presented and explained in ways that do not undermine the 
development of accurate working models of system operation.    
For consumer facing applications it may be beneficial to 
operationalize transparency so as to promote user confidence in 
approximate system models allowing underlying complexity to be 
hidden from the user. In other contexts, however, we may want to 
have users very carefully evaluate a system prediction. For 
example, we may not want doctors to simply defer to the 
predictions of a medical decision support system. We may instead 
want to lead them to question their underlying model while using 
the system. For such cases, it may be beneficial to operationalize 
transparency to promote careful consideration with moderate 
amounts of expectation violation. This may be a difficult balance 
to achieve between questioning and validating a system model so 
that while skeptical users would continue to trust and use the 
algorithm. 
Overall our results offer a new framework to synthesize 
paradoxical results surrounding transparency, explaining these in 
terms of social science theory. They also suggest new design 
implications when tackling this critical emerging area.  
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